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СОЦИАЛЬНО-ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКОЕ И ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЕ РАЗВИТИЕ ЧЕЧЕНО-ИНГУШСКОЙ АССР В ГОДЫ ПЕРЕСТРОЙКИ

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Аннотация

Статья посвящена проблемам, которые связаны с важнейшими изменениями в политической и социально-экономической сферах Чечено-Ингушской АССР, которые происходили в период перестройки. Фактически, в статье рассматриваются предпосылки чеченского конфликта, который разгорится в начале 90-х гг. XX века. Представлен анализ причин создания возникновения национальных общественных организаций, а также проанализирована связь экономических проблем республики с приходом к власти радикально настроенных политиков.

Ключевые слова: перестройка, демократизация общества, независимость, национальная элита, безработица.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHECHEN- INGUSH ASSR IN THE YEARS OF PERESTROIKA

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ABSTRACT

The article is devoted to the problems that are associated with the most important changes in the political and socio-economic spheres of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic that took place during the period of perestroika. In fact, the article examines the prerequisites for the Chechen conflict, which will flare up in the early 90s. XX century. An analysis of the reasons for the creation of national public organizations is presented, as well as the connection between the economic problems of the republic and the coming to power of radical politicians is analyzed.

Keywords: perestroika, democratization of society, independence, national elite, unemployment.

The military conflict in Chechnya, which lasted from 1994-1996, became a serious test for modern Russia, which had just begun to take shape. For Russian society, this was a great shock. The situation in the country and for the Russian authorities became much more complicated.

For many, the First Chechen War turned out to be an incomprehensible conflict, interest in which greatly faded after its end. However, the conflict itself was predetermined by the specifics of the region. The North Caucasus has always been a problem area in Russia. This was due to the fact that dozens of nationalities lived in a relatively small area. Very often, problems of a social, political or economic nature developed into interethnic conflicts [3: 5].

If we take a closer look at the reasons for the start of the First Chechen War, it becomes clear that the root of all problems lies in the events that unfolded in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in the period 1985-1991. The socio-economic and political aspects of these events are seen as especially important.

With the coming to power in the USSR, M.S. Gorbachev, the period of perestroika began in the development of our country, which was characterized by significant changes in the socio-political life of the Soviet Union. At first, the policy of M.S. Gorbachev, will subsequently lead to disappointment among society and this against the backdrop of the emergence of political opposition, which will appear with the development of democracy and political pluralism during the years of perestroika.

The situation in the CHIASSR was no exception. In 1983, party functionary D. Zavgaev came to power in the republic, whose management style was no different from the traditional bureaucratic style of those years. Zavgaev's policy, among other things, assumed the concealment of the history of the Caucasus and some events from the Chechen history [4: 13].

Surprisingly, before the beginning of perestroika, the Chechen-Ingush ASSR was a republic in which pro-Soviet sentiments were strong. With the proclamation of perestroika and the beginning of the policy of glasnost, the situation in the republic began to change.

The local population really hoped that due to changes in the internal policy of the country, it would change in the sphere of rights and freedoms within the republic itself. They favorably treated the figure of Zavgaev himself, on whom great hopes were pinned, since he was the first ethnic Chechen who stood at the head of the CHIASSR.

With the proclamation of the perestroika policy, D. Zavgaev's policy will also change and become more liberal. In particular, the influence of the KGB in the republic will decrease. In addition, the local leadership will begin to reduce the influence of state ideology in Checheno-Ingushetia and strengthen traditionalist sentiments.

This will be manifested in the reduction of pressure on local media, as well as in the creation of an independent spiritual administration, which in turn will lead to more active construction of mosques and the opening of Islamic institutions. Another important indulgence will be the fact that local Muslims were allowed to make the Hajj, a pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia.

The period of perestroika was the time when Chechen society got the opportunity to define itself. In parallel with the changes within the republic, the attitude towards Chechens in Soviet society began to change. It was at this time that prominent figures of Chechen origin began to appear in various fields [1].

Thus, such scientists as I. Arsakhanov, I. Aleroev, S. Zoev, R. Khasbulatov and many others declared themselves in the scientific field. The first Chechen generals appeared in the Soviet army: D. Dudayev, V. Shabakhov, V. Ibragimov. Thus, a national elite was formed that could represent the interests of the Chechens outside the republic. According to A. Matveev, it was the formed national elite that had to deal with the protection of human rights in the republic with the prospect of gaining political influence.

In addition, the republican capital, the city of Grozny, has also changed. During the period of perestroika, Grozny was one of the main industrial, cultural and scientific centers of the North Caucasus, in which civic activity flourished [7: 150].

In parallel with the national elite outside Checheno-Ingushetia, an elite within the republic began to form, which consisted of local leaders of public opinion. One of these leaders was the Chechen journalist L. Saligov, who, being a native of the scientific and educational society "Kavkaz", became the publisher of the authoritative printed bulletin "Justice".

Another representative of the local elite was R. Ezbulatov, who gained fame as one of the leaders of the environmental movement of the republic. Khozh-Akhmed Bisultanov also stood out. As an engineer of the Vtorchermet association, he turned into one of the most active political activists in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

Despite the positive changes in the political sphere of the life of the republic, the economic situation worsened from year to year. This was a logical consequence of the crisis that covered the whole country at that time. The main economic problems of the republic were the growth of unemployment, especially among the rural population, as well as the archaization of production associated with the loss of modern technologies. In Checheno-Ingushetia, as well as throughout the country, there was a crisis in the agricultural sector.

According to the calculations of the doctor of economic sciences M.M. Magomadov, unemployment in the CHIASSR during the years of perestroika fluctuated in the range of 50-70%. Approximately 100-200 thousand people of the total number of unemployed in the republic were residents of rural areas [8: 304].

According to Doctor of Economic Sciences R. Khasbulatov, the economic crisis in Checheno-Ingushetia was caused by the decline in the fuel and energy sector. It is known that many oil refineries operated in Grozny, which played an important role in the economy of the republic, however, according to the scientist, they were managed inefficiently. In addition, Khasbulatov pointed out that many high-quality oil reserves had been extracted from the republican subsoil.

Neither the federal center nor the local authorities headed by Zavgaev could solve the economic problems of the republic. The crisis worsened, and therefore, by the beginning of the 90s of the 20th century, the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was in the last 73rd place among the subjects of the USSR in terms of living standards.

Against the background of the developing economic crisis, in 1988, protest moods within Checheno-Ingushetia began to intensify. According to Professor V.A. Tishkov, civil communities in such republics as Checheno-Ingushetia sought to acquire statehood, which they had never possessed before [5: 5].

The first vivid manifestation of protest was the rallies in the city of Gudermes, which were caused by the construction of a biochemical plant. According to local experts, headed by R. Ezbulatov, the new plant could cause great damage to the health of local residents and the environment.

Considering the events of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant that occurred in 1986, protests on the basis of environmental problems were relevant. However, in the CHIASSR, environmental protests began to develop into political ones.

The number of informal political organizations of an oppositional orientation grew in the republic. For a long time, such organizations did not pose a great threat to the authorities, since organizational work was poorly established. Therefore, the activities of such organizations did not carry a systemic character.

In addition, there was no cooperation between these organizations, even despite the similarity of political programs. This was explained, first of all, by the personal ambitions of the leaders of the Chechen opposition.

It is worth noting that at the time of 1988 the Chechen opposition did not set itself the goal of secession from the USSR and gaining independence. The main task for the opponents of the government was to acquire the status of a union republic within the Soviet Union.

In 1988, the opposition movements of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic managed to unite under the auspices of an organization called the Union for the Promotion of Perestroika. Khozh-Akhmed Bisultanov stood at the head of the movement. Later, the organization was transformed into the People's Front of the CHIASSR, which would also be headed by Bisultanov.

The main driver of the protest movement in Checheno-Ingushetia were representatives of the poorest segments of the population, who hoped to improve the economic situation in the republic through political changes [6: 35].

In parallel with the strengthening of the opposition, the personnel policy of D. Zavgaev began to change, who expected to replace representatives of the old nomenklatura with his supporters in local party bodies. In this hardware struggle, Zavgaev, among other things, used the protest moods of the poor.

With the filing of D. Zavgaev, protests began in rural areas. During the rallies, demands were made to dismiss the leaders of the districts. Using the demands of the protesters as a reason for his resignation, Zavgaev replaced the first secretaries of the district committees in the period February-March 1990. The local media described these events as "spring leaf fall of the first secretaries."

However, it should be noted that the protesters could not achieve the desired result. They hoped that the old nomenklatura would be replaced by leaders of a new type, but in fact the same party functionaries came, only more loyal to Zavgaev.

Since 1989, the protest in Checheno-Ingushetia has become radicalized. It was at this time that the public movement "Bart" ("Unity") was created, which was headed by the well-known poet and writer Z. Yandarbiev in the republic. Before the start of perestroika, Yandarbiev was a systemic person and worked in the Union of Writers of the USSR, but on the wave of democratization he decided to engage in social and political activities.

Yandarbiev wanted to influence the political life in the republic and initially collaborated with L. Saligov, whom they knew. However, this collaboration was short-lived. Yandarbiev did not want to join the Union for the Promotion of Perestroika, as he was more radical. He advocated the creation of an independent and democratic Chechnya outside the USSR.

The activities of the Bart movement consisted of holding protests, as well as publishing their own newspaper, which promoted the idea of independence. On May 5, 1990, on the basis of the Bart movement, the Vainakh Democratic Party was created, which turned into the largest opposition political organization in the republic [10: 15].

The Vainakh Democratic Party tried to actively involve the highest army ranks in politics, who were very popular with the local population. Soviet generals R. Aushev, S. Beppaev, M. Kakhrimanov, as well as Colonel A. Maskhadov declared their political ambitions.

Thus, by 1990 the political landscape in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was represented by three main political groups.

The first is the party leadership headed by D. Zavgaev, who hoped to control the radical opposition and use it to put pressure on Moscow. The second - representatives of national organizations, united in the People's Front of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, which advocated the expansion of the rights of the republic within the USSR. The third is the Vainakh Democratic Party, led by former military men, which advocated the complete independence of Chechnya. It is worth noting that the scientific intelligentsia, which was popular at the beginning of perestroika, could not convert it into political influence, and therefore did not participate in this confrontation.

Despite the involvement of the military, the most popular among the population of the republic was the general of the Soviet army D. Dudayev. Dudayev was considered a national hero, as he became the first Chechen to receive the rank of general. That is why, at the National Congress of the Chechen people, which was held on the initiative of the Vainakh Democratic Party from November 23 to 25, 1990, D. Dudayev was elected chairman of the executive committee. At the same Congress, a "declaration on the sovereignty of the Chechen Republic" was adopted.

Dudayev himself at that time was on duty in Estonia. He was the commander of a bomber air division. Considering that Dudayev did not live in Chechnya, his first deputy L. Umkhaev took over the actual leadership of the executive committee. Initially, Dudayev was supposed to be an exclusively representative figure, not making any decisions.

The national congress of the Chechen people showed the division of the Vainakh Democratic Party into two wings: radical and more moderate. The radicals were in favor of forceful methods to achieve the goal, while the representatives of the moderate wing were in favor of reforms, primarily economic ones. The radicals were headed by Z. Yandarbiev, the moderate wing was headed by L. Umkhaev [6: 36].

In the spring of 1991, D. Dudayev retired from the army and moved with his family to Grozny. From the moment he returned to Chechnya, Dudayev began to be active in politics, with the support of the radical wing of the Vainakh Democratic Party.

Dudayev began to travel around the republic with active campaigning. It is worth noting that he mainly addressed not the urban intelligentsia, but the inhabitants of the countryside. In his speeches, Dudayev promised to transform the republic and implement a "grand" economic program that would raise the standard of living in the republic to the level of Western Europe and the United States.

Despite Dudayev's extremely populist statements, his popularity in the republic grew. The poorest segments of the population saw in Dudayev a hope for a brighter future. However, representatives of the moderate wing of the Vainakh Democratic Party looked at the prospects of D. Dudayev with skepticism.

However, Dudayev's rapprochement with the radicals meant that in the intra-party confrontation with the moderate wing, representatives of the radical wing won. In addition, as soon as Dudayev returned to the republic from Estonia, L. Umkhaev was removed from the management of the executive committee, which weakened the position of moderate supporters of independence.

Against the backdrop of the growing popularity of D. Dudaev, officially the head of the republic D. Zavgaev made an attempt to intercept the agenda from his opponent and on November 27, 1990 signs the Declaration on the state sovereignty of the Chechen-Ingush Republic. However, Zavgaev's calculation did not materialize, the majority of the population no longer perceived him as the real head of the republic.

In addition, the Declaration signed by Zavgaev had a dual force from a legal point of view. On the one hand, it allowed Dudayev's supporters to create an independent state, which they proclaimed. On the other hand, the Declaration did not mention secession from the RSFSR [2].

On May 25, 1991, D. Dudayev announced that the Supreme Council of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was no longer legitimate, referring to the Declaration of Sovereignty of the Chechen-Ingush Republic. As a transitional government, Dudayev announced the National Movement of the Chechen People bloc, consisting of the Vainakh Democratic Party and movements friendly to it. Justifying his decision, he stated that only the "National Movement of the Chechen People" truly enjoys the support of the population.

On June 8, 1991, the first session of the National Congress of the Chechen People (OKCHN) was held, which actually took over the functions of executive power. A month later, in July 1991,

OKCHN announced the creation of an independent state - the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (ChRI).

Dual power reigned in the republic, on the one hand the head of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic D. Zavgaev, on the other hand, the OKCHN, which ruled the CRI. Surprising was the fact that all the events that took place in Chechnya took place with the full connivance of Moscow.

This attitude is explained by the fact that the Soviet leadership, represented by M.S. Gorbachev was busy confronting the democratic opposition, headed by B.N. Yeltsin. The army was subordinate to Gorbachev, who saw no reason to suppress the radical opposition in Chechnya. As for the democrats, on the contrary, they saw Dudayev and his supporters not as a problem, but as allies, since the rhetoric of the Chechen general was similar to theirs [9: 134].

In July 1991, D. Zavgaev had a chance to seize the initiative in the political struggle with D. Dudayev. An inter-ethnic conflict broke out in the republic between Chechens and Kumyks. The conflict was extinguished at the initial stage, thanks to the efforts of Zavgaev, who addressed the elders, calling for an end to the bloodshed. The elders listened to Zavgaev and, refusing violence, ended the conflict.

Despite the fact that the solution of this conflict gave Zavgaev political points, already in August 1991 the situation changed again not in favor of the current head of the republic. The putsch began in Moscow. Zavgaev hesitated for a long time with his position, and only realizing on whose side the initiative was, he spoke out against the State Emergency Committee.

Unlike Zavgaev, the OKChN acted more decisively, coming out immediately against the putschists. As early as August 19, the OKCHN issued a decree stating that the actions of the State Emergency Committee were a coup d'état. In addition to this, the radicals took their supporters to a rally in the center of Grozny.

The events of the August putsch finally undermined the confidence in the power of D. Zavgaev, and therefore, by the autumn of 1991, Dudayev, with the support of the radical wing of the opposition, would establish his power in the republic by force.

On October 27, 1991, elections of the president of the CRI will be held, D. Dudayev, who will be nominated by the Vainakh Democratic Party, is expected to win them. It is worth noting that neither the official authorities of the USSR nor the authorities of the RSFSR recognized the results of the elections.

Therefore, we can conclude that despite the policy pursued by the local administration, which corresponded to the spirit of that time, the main economic problems could not be solved. On the contrary, the aggravated economic problems led to a political crisis in the republic, as a result of which radical forces came to power.

The sociological surveys conducted later also speak of the economic component of the crisis. Sociology showed that about 60% of respondents named the depressing economic situation as the main reason for the growth of nationalist sentiments in the republic.

It is also worth noting that the artificial introduction of democratic elements into politics, in a republic where the population was not ready for such rhetoric, led to the fact that freedom bordered on irresponsibility, and democracy grew into anarchy.

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